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This study examines the decision by firm owners to apply, or not, for intermediated 
debt. Based on a sample of SMEs in 9 European countries over the period 2009-2012, we 
examine firm characteristics, institutional and cultural factors, along with time, industry and 
year variables. We focus our analyses in two distinct groups of firms, those that applied 
for debt and firms that did not apply for fear of rejection. We find evidence that firm age, 
size and existing debt capacity matter, as do bank and liquidity conditions. We provide 
evidence for the first time that national culture correlates to the decisions to apply or 
not for credit. Policy implications of these findings are discussed.  
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 Introduction  
 
The ability of firms to access finance is a recurring theme in the small and medium sized enterprise (SME) 
literature, and it has featured even more prominently in recent years (e.g. Holton et al., 2011). The onset of the 
economic recession, combined with the banking crisis has resulted in a very difficult business and financing 
environment for small firms. This is of particular interest to the policy makers concerned with stubbornly high 
rates of unemployment, as SMEs are an important source of job creation and account for over 60% of 
employment in many economies (e.g. Ayyagari et al. 2009). Adequate supply of finance for small firms is 
therefore a pressing concern.  
 
During the current crisis, governments around the globe have introduced or accelerated a number of initiatives 
in an attempt to stimulate growth and investment by and in the sector, such as the Small Firms Jobs Act in the 
US and the Merlin agreement in the UK. Within the EU, various government initiatives have either been 
established or expanded, focusing on provision of exports credits, capital supports and enhancing access to 
operating capital for SMEs. In a number of peripheral euro area countries, government programs aiming at 
supporting credit supply to the SMEs have been set with explicit numerical targets for banks lending. Although 
the need for, and efficacy of such schemes is not apparent, they remain a cornerstone of government policy in 
most Western countries as government seek to promote employment creation and growth.  
 
Concentration of initiatives on the supply side ignores the complex, multifaceted issues involved in the demand 
for, and supply of finance to SMEs. The literature on SME financing is often neatly characterized as ‘supply side’ 
or ‘demand side’ studies. The former is polarized into arguments suggesting oversupply (De Meza and Webb, 
1987) or undersupply (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) of external finance. Demand side studies typically examine 
determinants of debt ratios or choice of external finance. Previous studies indicate the importance of many 
micro- and macroeconomic factors in determining resourcing of the sector, including firm-level factors (e.g. 
Sogorb Mira, 2005; López-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira, 2008), owner characteristics  (Hussain and Matlay, 2007; 
Salazar, 2007), macroeconomic factors, institutional factors (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006), and cultural 
aspects. These studies typically examine determinants of debt ratios, choice of external finance (debt or 
equity), and aspects of financial management.   
 
Whilst ‘supply side’ and ‘demand side’ studies dominate the SME financing literature, they generally do not 
give a completely accurate picture of the subject. Although it is a pertinent question, studies have only recently 
begun to examine whether firms require finance but are reluctant to ask for fear of refusal. Kon and Storey’s 
(2003) seminal paper provided a theoretical basis for this issue, and it has been addressed by a number of 
researchers in empirical studies (Han et al., 2009). Notwithstanding the difficulty in ascertaining 
discouragement precisely (discouragement is not directly observable), it has been evidenced as a significant 
issue. One would expect levels of discouragement to be even greater in times of financial crisis resulting in a 
credit crunch, at which time small businesses may be particularly vulnerable (Udell, 2009).  
 
This study investigates these perennial issues by examining the decision to apply for bank debt, or not apply 
for fear of refusal in relation to firms with adequate funding. We seek to add to the literature by investigating 
not only potential firm characteristic determinants, but also institutional, regulatory and cultural factors. We 
therefore aim to inform policy debate about intervention in SME financing markets, and whether such 
intervention is justifiable or needed. 
Previous Literature on Access to Finance 
 
SME financing is a multifaceted issue, influenced not only by country-level, institutional and regulatory factors, 
but also by micro level characteristics. This is reflected in a broad literature on the subject. Issues initially 
addressed in the literature concerned the adequate supply of finance, as debate polarized between over and 
under supply (De Meza and Webb, 1987, Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Subsequent studies investigated demand-
side issues (e.g. Mac an Bhaird and Lucey, 2010), initially single-country (Michaelas et al., 1998), followed by 
multi-country (Hall et al., 2004). Other studies considered included institutional, regulatory, legal, 
macroeconomic and cultural issues. A number of stylized facts have emerged from theories of capital structure 
 tested in these papers. This evidence forms the basis for this empirical study examining  potential 
determinants of discouragement in applying for investment finance.  
 
It is widely accepted that firm characteristics are an important determinant of finance (e.g Mateev et al, 2013). 
In general, larger, older firms are likely to have greater reserves than younger, smaller firms. They are also 
likely to have greater access to finance, primarily because of reduced opacity over time, thereby reducing 
agency concerns. Additionally, older firms have established relationships with one or more banks, and these 
reputational effects result in easier access to bank debt. These borrowers are also more likely to apply for 
finance, given past experience (if it was successful). We hypothesise: 
 
H1: Larger, older firms have a greater probability of applying for bank debt 
 
This is, of course dependent on the present financial conditions in the firm. Businesses in financial distress will 
likely experience a much more difficult external financing environment than their well-resourced counterparts, 
notwithstanding age or size. Firms experiencing reduced profitability, along with decreasing financial slack will 
likely have a greater need for increased amounts of external finance, but will have more difficulty in accessing 
the required amount especially with banks using financial statement based lending technologies. This, in turn, 
means that firms experiencing financial distress are reluctant to apply for bank loans because of perceived 
reluctance of banks to advance debt1.  This suggests: 
 
H2: Firms with decreasing debt/assets ratios have a greater probability of applying for bank debt 
 
H3: The perception of the willingness of banks to provide bank debt is negatively related to debt applications 
 
Additionally, firms experiencing increasing profitability are likely to be reducing debt burdens, rather than 
seeking additional debt. From previous evidence, it is reasonable to infer that increased profitability results in 
increased liquidity, and therefore reduce the need for external finance (Vos et al, 2007). On the other hand, 
firms experiencing decreasing profitability are facing increasing demand for external sources of funding, but 
can be discouraged from applying for debt, especially from institutions, like banks, which use financial 
performance assessments of applicants as a basis for advancing finance. 
H4: Firms with decreasing profitability have a greater probability of applying for bank debt. 
 
 
Regarding increased concentration of banking markets, Han et al. (2009) find that low risk borrowers are less 
likely to be discouraged in concentrated markets than in competitive markets and that, in concentrated 
markets, high risk borrowers are more likely to be discouraged the longer their financial relationships. Thus 
we propose that: 
 
H5: Greater concentration of the banking market is negatively related to the probability of applying for bank debt. 
 
 
We also consider the effect of cultural factors on the decision to apply for debt, or not apply for fear of rejection 
taking the following four of Hofstede’s measures into account: 
 
Power Distance: Power distance scores inform us about dependence relationships in a country. It is defined as 
the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organisations within a country expect and 
accept that power is distributed unequally. (The way power is distributed is usually explained from the 
behaviour of the more powerful members – the leaders rather than those led). In those countries with a high 
power distance score, there is more deference to authority. Banks could be thought of as being the more 
powerful organisations, with SMEs being the weaker, subordinate organisations (After all, the SMEs go to the 
banks requesting funding – banks are in the position of authority). Chui et al (2002) find that higher degrees of 
Schwartz and Sagiv’s (1995) ‘mastery’ (which could approximate Hofstede’s power distance) are associated 
                                                        
1 You could also hypothesise that, given the macroeconomic environment and prevailing credit crunch that banks have significantly reduced 
lending, and therefore firms are reluctant to apply (given the perception abroad in the land that ‘banks aren’t lending’. And they aren’t!) 
 with lower debt ratios. Additionally, in small power distance states “subordinates expect to be consulted”. This 
suggests that SMEs in small power distance states may have a more consultative role with the banks – that they 
can at least bargain or negotiate their debt agreements with the banks. Therefore, one would arguably expect 
that this gives them access to higher levels of debt, or at least to negotiate for loans – much more than it does in 
higher power distance countries. It is hypothesised, therefore, that there is an inverse relationship between 
power distance and applications for debt.  
 
H6: There is an inverse relationship between power distance and the probability of applying for debt. 
 
Individualism: Individualism pertains to societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is 
expected to look after himself and his immediate family. Collectivism as its opposite pertains to societies in 
which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people’s 
lifetimes continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.  
 
Gleason, Mathur and Mathur (2000) argue from Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) that cultures with high 
individuality tend to be associated with managers/owners looking after their own interests and enhancing 
their reputation. Therefore, they are likely to choose lower debt in order to maximise success. Personal 
freedom is an important component of the individualist pole, suggesting that SME owners do not wish to have 
high levels of debt. Additionally, as “autonomy is the ideal”, this suggests that firm owners in highly 
individualistic societies will finance the firm with equity as much as possible. Thus, we hypothesise: 
 
H7: There is an inverse relationship between individualism and the probability of applying for debt. 
 
Masculinity: “A society is called masculine when emotional gender roles are clearly distinct: men are supposed 
to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success, whereas women are supposed to be more modest, 
tender, and concerned with the quality of life” (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005: p.120).  
 
De Jong and Semenov (2002) argue that the degree of masculinity is synonymous with support for competitive 
processes and outcomes and associated with greater stock market depth. This suggests the possibility that 
Hofstede’s (2001) measure of the degree of masculinity might well have implications for the capital structure 
of SMEs by influencing the appetite of owner-managers for debt and possibly for long-term rather than short-
term debt. SME owners pursuing growth may have a greater appetite for debt, and greater disregard for 
agency considerations. Therefore, we hypothesise: 
 
H8: There is a positive relationship between masculinity and the probability of applying for debt. 
 
Uncertainty avoidance: Uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened 
by ambiguous or unknown situations. It is well established in the literature that SME owners desire to avoid 
uncertainty, and have an overriding goal to retain control of the firm. Additionally, Chui et al (2002) find that 
higher degrees of ‘conservatism’ (which could approximate Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance) are associated 
with lower corporate debt ratios. In addition, Gleason et al (2000) argue that because higher debt leads to 
greater risks of corporate bankruptcy, higher uncertainty avoidance should lead to lower levels of debt in 
corporate capital structures. Therefore, we hypothesise that: 
 
H9: Uncertainty avoidance is negatively related with the probability of applying for debt. 
Data and Methodology  
Data 
Our sample is based on the “Survey on the access to finance of SMEs” (SAFE), which consists of a questionnaire 
administered to a number of companies in the European Union, conducted on behalf of the European 
Commission (Directorate General Enterprise and Industry) and the European Central Bank (ECB). We worked 
with the first five waves (from the first semester of 2009 till the first semester of 2011). The companies in the 
sample were randomly selected from the Dun & Bradstreet database of firms. The sample is stratified by firm 
size class, by economic activity2 and by country3. For many of the survey waves, the smallest countries of the 
                                                        
2 At the 1-digit level of the European NACE-Nomenclature 
 euro area were not included in the survey “for efficiency reasons” (namely, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia) and that is why for the sake of comparability, homogeneity and coherence we exclude 
them for all the waves of the sample. The number of firms in each of these strata of the sample was 
intentionally modified in the survey to increase its accuracy by activity and size class. The companies we work 
with are micro (1 to 9 employees), small (10 to 49 employees) and medium-sized firms (50 to 249 employees). 
The interviews were conducted through internet questionnaire or on paper, via fax, or (predominantly) by 
telephone. The person interviewed in each company was a top level executive (general manager, financial 
director or chief accountant). Full details on the survey and its administration are available from the ECB.  
 
Variables  
There are different versions of the questionnaire used for the survey. For the sake of homogeneity, we have 
only considered the items that were present in all the semesters’ surveys.4  
Our dependent variable is the survey item: With respect to Banks’ loans (either new or renewal): did you apply 
for them over the past 6 months, or not? 1: Applied, 2: No, because of possible rejection, 3: No, because of sufficient 
internal funds, 4: No, for other reasons, 9: DKNA. The firm-semester observations for the last two responses 
were excluded because of insufficient information provided. Thus we find ourselves with three categories : 
firms that did not apply as they judged themselves to have sufficient funds (our base case), those that did and 
those that did not reply for fear of refusal.  
Dependent and independent variables are described in table 1.  
 
Methodology 
We use a multinomial logit regression. This is similar to a logistic analysis but is appropriate for the case of 
more than two categories of the dependent variable which in addition, cannot be ordered in any meaningful 
way, as it is our case. As noted our main categories will be 1: Applied, 2: No, because of possible rejection and  
3: No, because of suffic internal funds. The categories 4: No, for other reasons and 9: DKNA were excluded from 
the analysis, DKNA for obvious reasons and 4 due to inherent uncertainty as to what the answer represents.  
 
The multinomial logit model assumptions are that: 1) data are case specific; that is, each independent variable 
has a single value for each case. So, there is no need for the independent variables to be statistically 
independent from each other; however, collinearity is assumed to be relatively low, as it becomes difficult to 
differentiate between the impact of several variables if they are highly correlated 2) assumption of 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA): this assumption states that the odds of preferring one class over 
another do not depend on the presence or absence of other "irrelevant" alternatives. As all the potential 
responses are suitably collected in the questionnaire for our dependent variable, we argue that this 
assumption should not be much of a problem, as if we should add one more category the responses to the 
already existing categories should not change perceptibly.  
 
One of the issues that merit a mention is that for computing multinomial logit, the regression needs one of the 
categories to be declared as the outcome base, and thus, the sign of the coefficients of the explanatory variables 
so calculated can be interpreted as the positive or negative influence that that independent variable exerts 
within a specific category compared to the one of the base variable. This is important feature to be taken into 
account, as we shall see later in the results section. In our case, we selected the category: 3: No, because of 
sufficient internal fund, as our base outcome, as this is the only one in which the offer of funds has absolutely no 
influence in its value.  
 
Our first set of 10 firm characteristic variables includes the number of employees (SIZE), age (AGE), access to 
finance as most pressing problem (ACCESS), change in turnover (∆TURNOVER), change in debt/assets ratio 
(FINSLACK), no financial debt (NODEBT), increase in need for bank loans (NEEDS), change in level of capital 
(CAPITAL), change in credit history (CREDHISTORY), and perception of willingness of banks to provide loans 
(WILLING). These are presented in vector (1). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
3 The four largest euro area countries Germany, Spain, France, and Italy have a larger number of observations. Within these the survey is 
representative of the distribution of firms, but not necessarily elsewhere.   
4 Nevertheless, we run the regressions for those excluded variables we considered of some importance and that were present only in one or two 
of the waves, and the results were coherent with the ones of the more similar variable or concept present in all the surveys and that do enter 
the regressions as a explanatory variable.  
  
Firm = F(SIZE, AGE, ACCESS, ∆TURNOVER, FINSLACK, NODEBT, NEEDS, CAPITAL, 
 CREDHISTORY, WILLING)       (1) 
 
Our macroeconomic variables in vector (2) include Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and government bond 
yields (10YEAR). 
 
Macro = M(GDP, 10YEAR)        (2) 
 
 
We include two regulatory variables in vector (3). These include regulatory quality (REGQUAL), and the quality 
of contract enforcement (CONTRACT).  
 
Regulatory = R(REGQUAL, CONTRACT)       (3) 
 
 
We also include a vector of banking industry variables, including the rate of recovery under bankruptcy 
(BANKRUPTCY), the degree of concentration in the banking sector (HERFINDAL), availability of private sector 
credit (PRIVATECREDIT), and a measure of the prime rate of lending (BANKRATE). This is represented in the 
vector: 
 
Banking = B(BANKRUPTCY, HERFINDAL, PRIVATECREDIT, BANKRATE)  (4) 
 
 
Our cultural variables are from Hofstede’s (2001) measures of the degree of masculinity (MASC), the degree of 
individuality (INDV), the degree of power distance (POWD) and the degree of uncertainty avoidance (UNCA).  
 
Culture = C (MASC, INDV, POWD, UNCA)     (5) 
   
 
We use four industry sectors including industry (IND), construction (CON), trade (TRADE), and services (SER). 
These are presented in vector (6). 
 
 Ind = G(IND, CON, TRADE, SER)       (6) 
 
We use five time dummies, representative of each iteration of the survey, and we also use 9 country dummies. 
 
Our ‘omnibus’ model can therefore be represented by: 
 
IndCultureBankingREgulatoryMacroFirmApply iit  0   
         i




‘Base’ model  
 
 
Looking at the base case variables first, we find some consistent results. In all cases we find that larger 
companies are significantly more likely to apply and are less likely to be discouraged.  This is consistent with 
the findings of Lawless, Holton, and McCann (2012) and Holton, Lawless, and McCann (2012) that older and 
larger firms are less likely to be rejected  older firms are significantly less likely to be discouraged across all 
models. It is also consistent with the findings of Chakravarty and Xiang (2012) who analyse word bank data for 
 developing and emerging market firms. The findings of Artola and Genre (2011) suggest that younger and 
smaller firms suffer most when credit conditions dis-improve. 
 
Companies who indicated that access to finance was a problem were more likely than the base case to apply, 
but the discouraged borrower hypothesis is indicated by the consistent finding that the magnitude of this 
variable is always greater for discouraged. In other words companies who find access to finance a problem are 
more likely to be discouraged than they are to apply. Consistent with the importance of cash flow increased 
turnover matters. It enters negatively in all cases, suggesting that rising turnover decreases the need to apply 
and decreases discouragement. It is however insignificant in the omnibus models, and significant only in the 
banking, regulatory and external models. Firms with financial slack are less likely to apply and less likely to be 
discouraged. This finding is consistent and significant across the broad range of results, with the exception of 
discouraged borrowers only in the culture model.  Firms with a need for capital are both more likely to apply 
and more likely to be discouraged. The effect is significant across models and the magnitude is noticeably 
greater for applying firms. Credit history is important for discouraged borrowers, an improvement in same 
acting, as we might expect, to reduce discouragement. This finding is consistent and significant across models. 
 
A perception of bank willingness to lend also acts as we might expect in terms of significantly reducing 
discouragement. However it also seems to act to reduce applications. This finding is unexpected.  
 
Augmented models  
Moving to the different models, we first examine a number of models where we add potential explanatory 
variables across domains. We separately examine banking, regulatory, macroeconomic and cultural variables.  
Evidence from Mauro (1995) stresses the importance for smaller firms of the external environment.  
 
Turning to the banking variables, we find that the Herfindal index, our proxy for competition in the banking 
market, enters negatively, indicating that greater concentration in the banking market adversely affects the 
decision to apply. This echoes the finding of Han et al (2009) . However, greater concentration also reduces the 
odds of firms not applying, a contradictory result.  We find that the loan rate enters positively for both applying 
and more so for not applying. This suggests that higher rates discourage borrowers, unsurprisingly, and that 
discourages applications. Brown et al. (2011) note that high interest rates serve both as a credit availability 
signaling mechanism and as a screening mechanism. It is entirely probable that this dual role is reflected here 
with higher quality projects being put forward for application by firms knowing that there is credit rationing. 
Poorer quality project firms respond to this credit rationing by not applying knowing the combination of 
poorer quality of their projects and lower credit availability will impact on them. We find that a higher rate of 
recovery of loans has no impact on the decision to apply but marginally reduces the incidence of 
discouragement. This is consistent with the findings in Brown et al. (2011) 
 
Examining further regulatory variables we find these to impact only on the decision to apply, and that this does 
not map to the omnibus models.  Increased regulatory quality and increased contract enforcement reduce the 
likelihood of applying for a loan. Both Vitols (1998), Wieneke and Gries (2011) stress the importance of 
regulatory quality (albeit mainly in the financial sector) as a context for firm credit. In a developing county 
setting Chakravarty and Xiang (2012) find little impact from regulatory or institutional quality variables on 
discouragement. 
 
Macroeconomic variables show that higher government bond yields (reflecting financial sector stress as 
suggested by Lawless, Holton, and McCann (2012)) increase discouragement. This effect persists in the 
omnibus models. Although statistically significant the magnitude of the GDP per capita variable is effectively 
zero. A similar finding, of the relative unimportance of country macroeconomic development, is found in 
Chakravarty and Xiang (2012).  The ratio of private credit to GDP does not appear to impact. This is contrary to 
the finding in Lawless, Holton, and McCann (2012). Overall, the effect of the macroeconomic variables suggests, 
potentially, that these acts as prior sensoring mechanisms for other variables, such as overall banking sector 
variables. Thus, macroeconomic stress translates into SMEs financing environments via more direct channels 
relating to banking sector overall supply of credit conditions and firms’ own factors determining the SMEs 
demand for credit and propensity to apply for credit. 
 
 Analysis of the cultural variables yields some very interesting insights. With respect to individualism, we 
confirm a negative sign for the applied group as SMEs’ managers tend to be more conservative and borrow less 
in high individualist countries. With respect to the discouraged group, there is no a priori expectation because 
the fear of rejection does not seem to be linked with individualism. In fact, more individualistic agents may well 
decide to “do their own thing”. In this context, we note that individualism is inversely related to herding. In a 
context where there is a pervasive “gloom” regarding finance a more individualist agent (or one in a country 
exhibiting higher degrees of individualism) might well decide to go against the prevailing notion, and reject the 
“there is no point in applying” meme. See Beckmann, Menkhoff, and Suto (2008) for further details on this. This 
would result in a negative relationship, which we find here in reputational banking (the case especially salient 
for Europe and for SMEs in particular). Rejection is a negative signal for future capital raising capacity, hence 
more individualist SMEs might opt for more ex-ante secured channels of funding and this can appear to be an 
ad hoc correlate to rejection of the ‘there’s no point in applying’ view. 
 
Regarding masculinity, we observe a positive relationship for the group that applied for finance as 
hypothesised. For the discouraged group, we have an expectation of a negative relation, as discouragement 
should be overcome, to some extent, by the risk and competitive element of masculinity. We do not find this, 
finding instead that greater masculinity is associated with a higher, not lower, incidence of non-application.  
 
Regarding uncertainty avoidance, we do not find a significant relationship for the ‘applied for finance’ group. 
We do not expect a particular sign in the discouraged group: avoidance of risk by the part of the debtors should 
not influence the probability of rejection by the part of the creditors. The negative sign found in the regression 
could indicate perhaps that a degree of self censoring is at work, with greater uncertainty avoidance resulting 
in earlier and higher thresholds for investment, resulting in increased confidence in application for finance. 
(for some evidence congruent on this see Islam and Kantor (2005), Huang (2008) and  Carmona, Iyer, and 
Reckers (2011))  
 
 
Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
The policy implications that flow from these findings are clear. First, major determinants of the application 
decision operate at a firm level. These are generally not under the control of government or policy 
organizations and are thus not amenable to first order control. Second, macroeconomic variables seem to 
mainly operate via the bond yield, again more a target of government action than a policy variable, and 
potentially via the link between macroeconomic environment and the banking sector environment, as is 
consistent with the nature of the current crisis reflected in the data. Reducing the pressures of the current 
crisis on sovereign yields will not induce more applications but will reduce discouragement (resulting 
indirectly in more applications). This is pivotal to the current monetary policy debate that is focusing on 
alleviating the malfunctioning of the transmission mechanism for overall euro area monetary policy as, in part, 
the means for normalizing the operations of the SMEs credit markets. Third, banking concentration, an issue 
that government can address, has a double edged effect. Banking openness to lending also has this effect, but 
credit history (which can be improved at a national level by better bankruptcy resolution laws) does impact on 
discouragement. Finally, national culture, slow if not invariant to change, matters. Governments, in short, can 
do little overtly to reduce discouragement.  
   Table 1 : Variables Included 
Variable Description Measure 
SIZE Firm size  Defined by number of employees5, 
categorical variable, 1:Micro, 2:small, 
3: Medium  
AGE Firm age in years   1: < 2 years, 2: 2 to 4 years, 3: 5 to 9 
years, 4: > 10 years.  
ACCESS Dummy indicating whether 
the firm perceives access to 
finance as its most pressing 
problem. 
1 financing is the most important 
problem, 0 otherwise 
TURNOVER Change in firm turnover in 
the past 6 months.   
1:Decreased, 2: remained unchanged-
3: increased 
FINSLACK Change in debt/assets ratio 
over the past 6 months.  
1:Decreased, 2: remained unchanged-
3: increased 
NODEBT Dummy variable indicating 
whether firm has financial 
debt 
0=debt; 1=nodebt 
NEEDS Categorical variable 
indicating need for bank 
loans in past 6 months.  
1:Decreased, 2: remained unchanged-
3: increased 
CAPITAL Categorical variable 
indicating firm’s own 
financial capital level in 
past 6 months.  
1:Decreased, 2: remained unchanged-
3: increased 
CREDHIST Categorical variable 
indicating firm’s credit 
history in past 6 months  
1:Decreased, 2: remained unchanged-
3: increased 
WILLING Firm's perception about 
bank’s willingness to 
provide loans in past 6 
months  
1:Decreased, 2: remained unchanged-
3: increased 
GDP Gross Domestic Product Natural log of level of GDP per capita, 
current € terms.  
BANKRUPTCY A measure of the extent of 
average recovery of credit 
under bankruptcy 
 Percentage (Source: World Bank 
Doing Business Database)  
REGQUAL A composite measure of 
overall quality of 
regulation and 
enforcement 
Index (Source: World Bank Doing 
Business Database 
HERFINDAL A measure of concentration 
in banking 
Herfindal index for credit institutions, 
(Source: ECB) 
                                                        
5 Turnover and sales were also used as measures of size, with similar results. 
 CONTRACT A composite measure of 
ease of contract 
enforcement 
Index (Source: World Bank Doing 
Business Database 
BANKRATE Bank lending rate Bank overdraft rate for new business, 
non-financial corporations, all 
maturities, Annualised APR, average 
of 6 months of survey period (source 
Eurostat) 
PRIVATECREDIT Private Sector Credit  Ratio of private sector credit to GDP, 
ratio variable (Source World Bank) 
MASCULINITY A measure of masculinity  Natural log of index (source: 
www.geert-hofstede.com) 
INDIVIDUALITY A measure of individuality  Natural log of index (source: 
www.geert-hofstede.com) 
POWERDISTANCE A measure of power 
distance  
Natural log of index (source: 
www.geert-hofstede.com) 
UNCERTAIN A measure of uncertainty 
avoidance  




 TABLE 2. Results for the multinomial logit for the base model. 
“APPLIED” GROUP Coeff. Sig “DID NO  Did not apply for debt for fear  
of refusal 
Coeff. Sig 
SIZE 0.251  -0.326  
(9.220) ***    -(5.560) *** 
AGE 0.006     -0.186  
(0.190)     -(3.910) *** 
ACCESS 1.092     1.682  
(16.410) ***    (18.510) *** 
TURNOVER -0.001     -0.102  
-(0.030)     -(1.940) * 
FINSLACK -0.254     -0.113  
-(7.810) ***    -(2.030) ** 
NO DEBT 
 
-0.646     -0.267  
-(4.140) ***    -(1.020)  
NEEDS 1.120     0.473  
(29.170) ***    (7.360) *** 
CAPITAL 0.074     -0.150  
(1.890) *    -(2.180) ** 
CREDHIST -0.015     -0.177  
-(0.350)     -(2.500) ** 
WILLING -0.167     -0.971  
-(4.530) ***    -(12.660) *** 
INDIVIDUALISM 0.018     -0.023  
 (1.490)      -(1.200)   
MASCULINITY  -0.005     0.045  
 -(0.580)     (3.210) *** 
POWER DISTANCE 0.000     0.070  









 (2.810) ***    (0.390)  
10YEAR BOND YIELD 0.090     0.107  
 (3.250) ***    (2.630) *** 
GDPPER CAPITA 0.000     0.000  
 -(3.290) ***    -(1.830) * 
HERFINDHAL -2.400     -3.847  
 -(2.430) **    -(1.940) * 
PRIVATECRED -0.003     -0.008  
 -(1.030)     -(1.410)  
BANK RATE 0.038     0.018  
 (5.420) ***    (1.560)  
CREDIT RECOVERY 0.004     0.000  
 (1.140)     -(0.080)  
REGULATORY QUALITY 0.121     0.402  









 (0.850)     (0.890)   
CONSTANT -5.682     -8.312  
 -(2.970) ***    -(2.16) ** 
Number of observations 11393     11393  
Chi2 3384     3237  
P-seudo R2 0.162     0.155  
Log-likelihood -8733     -8807  
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